NÆRINGSØKONOMISK INSTITUTT - NØI
THE INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS - INDECO
THE OSLO SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS - OSE
Web: http://www.indeco.no - ISSN 0802-2364 - Org. nr 992945818 - tlf. 92 44 28 22 - Oslo - e-mail indeco@online.no
New crude oil price forecasts from INDECO
Nye råoljepris-prognoser fra NØI
NØI-INDECO's model for the crude oil market
The following analysis and forecasts are based on the market share variation model, a general conjectural game oligopoly model with dynamic aspects, originally presented in NØI-INDECO's Forskningsrapport nr 2 (1987): "Næringsøkonomi - Fokus på petroleumsbransjen" - Research Report no 2 (1987): "Industrial Economy - Focus on the Petroleum Branch", ISBN 82-90748-02-7, ISSN 0802-2364, quoting:
ABSTRACT. This report surveys international literature on industrial organization and economics, focusing the case of exhaustible resources, especially oil and natural gas. Satiation elasticities and a market share variation model are used as conceptual framework, in addition to the usual concepts of oligopoly theory and exhaustible resource management. The main conclusion is the following: Changes in the suppliers way of competing, i.e. the marketshare degree, and positive satiation elasticities, may to a large extent explain the market development and the price formation of the trade. The research report has been a mandatory syllabus in the Petroleum Economics course at ADH, now the University of Agder, and exam papers have also been given on the subject.
SAMMENDRAG. Denne rapporten refererer internasjonal litteratur på feltet næringsøkonomi og "industrial organization", med fokus på lagerressurser, spesielt petroleumsbransjen. Metningselastisiteter og en markedsandels-variasjonsmodell blir brukt som begrepsramme, i tillegg til de vanlige begrepene fra oligopolteori og forvaltning av lagerressurser. Hovedkonklusjonen er følgende: Endringer i konkurranseform, det vil si markedsandelsgraden, og positiv metningselastisitet, kan i stor grad forklare markedsutviklingen og prisdannelsen i bransjen. Forskningsrapporten har vært obligatorisk pensum i faget Petroleumsøkonomi ved ADH, nå Universitetet i Agder, og det har også vært gitt eksamens-oppgaver i stoffet.
This oil market model, in a bit simplified form, is also presented with the basic formulas, as a submodel of NØI-OSE-INDECO's general Cogrips-model, see the footnotes at (click on:) Samgripingsmodell - Cogripsmodel. Notat til Ragnar Frisch Seminar.
Forecasts and historical prices
Crude oil - US $ per barrel. Forecasts + - 15 US $ per barrel - Monthly averages
The 2009 monthly forecasts are: Jan. 35-65, Feb. 35-65, Mar. 35-65, Apr. 35-65, May 35-65, Jun. 45-75, Jul. 55-85, Aug. 55-85, Sep. 55-85, Oct. 55-85, Nov. 55-85, Dec. 60-90.
The 2009 monthly averages are: Jan. 43, Feb. 43, Mar. 47, Apr. 50, May 57, Jun. 69, Jul. 64, Aug. 73, Sep. 68, Oct. 73, Nov. 77, Dec. 74. - Average for 2009, 62.
The 2010 monthly forecasts are: Jan. 60-90, Feb. 60-90, Mar. 60-90, Apr. 65-95, May 65-95, Jun. 65-95, Jul. 65-95, Aug. 65-95, Sep. 65-95, Oct. 67-97, Nov. 67-97, Dec. 68-98.
The 2010 monthly averages are: Jan. 76, Feb. 74, Mar. 79, Apr. 85, May 76, Jun. 75, Jul. 76, Aug. 77, Sep. 78, Oct. 83, Nov. 85, Dec. 91. - Average for 2010, 80.
The 2011 monthly forecasts are: Jan. 75-105, Feb. 77-107, Mar. 90-120, Apr. 100-130, May 105-135, Jun. 105-135, Jul. 95-125, Aug. 100-130, Sep. 105-135, Oct. 90-120, Nov. 90-120, Dec. 90-120.
The 2011 monthly averages are: Jan. 97, Feb. 104, Mar. 115, Apr. 123, May 115, Jun. 114, Jul. 117, Aug. 110, Sep. 113, Oct. 110, Nov. 111, Dec. 108. - Average for 2011, 111.
The 2012 monthly forecasts are: Jan. 90-120, Feb. 100-130, Mar. 100-130, Apr. 105-135, May 105-135, Jun. 90-120, Jul. 80-110, Aug. 90-120, Sep. 90-120, Oct. 90-120, Nov. 90-120, Dec. 90-120.
The 2012 monthly averages are: Jan. 111, Feb. 119, Mar. 125, Apr. 120, May 110, Jun. 95, Jul. 103, Aug. 113, Sep. 113, Oct. 112, Nov. 109, Dec. 109. - Average for 2012, 112.
The 2013 monthly forecasts are: Jan. 90-120, Feb. 90-120, Mar. 90-120, Apr. 90-120, May 90-120, Jun. 90-120, Jul. 85-115, Aug. 85-115, Sep. 95-125, Oct. 90-120, Nov. 90-120, Dec. 90-120.
The 2013 monthly averages are: Jan. 113, Feb. 116, Mar. 108, Apr. 102, May 103, Jun. 103, Jul. 108, Aug. 111, Sep. 112, Oct. 109, Nov. 108, Dec. 111. - Average for 2013, 109.
The 2014 monthly forecasts are: Jan. 90-120, Feb. 90-120, Mar. 90-120, Apr. 90-120, May 90-120, Jun. 90-120, Jul. 95-125, Aug. 95-125, Sep. 95-125, Oct. 80-110, Nov. 70-100, Dec. 50-80.
The 2014 monthly averages are: Jan. 108, Feb. 109, Mar. 107, Apr. 108, May 110, Jun. 112, Jul. 107, Aug. 102, Sep. 97, Oct. 87, Nov. 79, Dec. 62. - Average for 2014, 99.
The 2015 monthly forecasts are: Jan. 40-70, Feb. 40-70, Mar. 40-70, Apr. 40-70, May 40-70, Jun. 40-70, Jul. 45-75, Aug. 45-75, Sep. 30-60, Oct. 30-60, Nov. 30-60, Dec. 30-60.
The 2015 monthly averages are: Jan. 48, Feb. 58, Mar. 56, Apr. 60, May 64, Jun. 61, Jul. 57, Aug. 47, Sep. 48, Oct. 48, Nov. 44, Dec. 38. - Average for 2015, 52.
The 2016 monthly forecasts are: Jan. 20-50, Feb. 20-50, Mar. 20-50, Apr. 25-55, May 25-55, Jun. 25-55, Jul. 30-60, Aug. 30-60, Sep. 30-60, Oct. 30-60, Nov. 30-60, Dec. 30-60.
The 2016 monthly averages are: Jan. 31, Feb. 32, Mar. 38, Apr. 42, May 47, Jun. 48, Jul. 45, Aug. 46, Sep. 47, Oct. 50, Nov. 45, Dec. 53. - Average for 2016, 44.
The 2017 monthly forecasts are: Jan. 40-70, Feb. 40-70, Mar. 40-70, Apr. 40-70, May 40-70, Jun. 40-70, Jul. 40-70, Aug. 40-70, Sep. 40-70, Oct. 40-70, Nov. 40-70, Dec. 40-70.
The 2017 monthly averages are: Jan. 55, Feb. 55, Mar. 52, Apr. 52, May 50, Jun. 46, Jul. 48, Aug. 52, Sep. 56, Oct. 58, Nov. 63, Dec. 64. - Average for 2017, 54.
The 2018 monthly forecasts are: Jan. 40-70, Feb. 40-70, Mar. 40-70, Apr. 50-80, May 50-80, Jun. 50-80, Jul. 55-85, Aug. 55-85, Sep. 55-85, Oct. 60-90, Nov. 60-90, Dec. 50-80.
The 2018 monthly averages are: Jan. 69, Feb. 65, Mar. 66, Apr. 72, May 77, Jun. 74, Jul. 74, Aug. 73, Sep. 79, Oct. 81, Nov. 65, Dec. 57. - Average for 2018, 71.
The 2019 monthly forecasts are: Jan. 45-75, Feb. 45-75, Mar. 45-75, Apr. 50-80, May 50-80, Jun. 50-80, Jul. 50-80, Aug. 50-80, Sep. 50-80, Oct. 50-80, Nov. 50-80, Dec. 50-80.
The 2019 monthly averages are: Jan. 59, Feb. 64, Mar. 66, Apr. 71, May 71, Jun. 64, Jul. 64, Aug. 59, Sep. 63, Oct. 60, Nov. 63, Dec. 67. - Average for 2019, 64.
The 2020 monthly forecasts are: Jan. 45-75, Feb. 45-75, Mar. 15-45, Apr. 15-45, May 10-40, Jun. 10-40, Jul. 20-50, Aug. 20-50, Sep. 20-50, Oct. 25-55, Nov. 30-60, Dec. 30-60.
The 2020 monthly averages are: Jan. 64, Feb. 56, Mar. 32, Apr. 18, May 29, Jun. 40, Jul. 43, Aug. 45, Sep. 41, Oct. 40, Nov. 43, Dec. 50. - Average for 2020, 42.
The 2021 monthly forecasts are: Jan. 40-70, Feb. 45-75, Mar. 45-75, Apr. 45-75, May 45-75, Jun. 45-75, Jul. 60-90, Aug. 60-90, Sep. 60-90, Oct. 70-100, Nov. 70-100, Dec. 70-100.
The 2021 monthly averages are: Jan. 55, Feb. 62, Mar. 65, Apr. 65, May 68, Jun. 73, Jul. 75, Aug. 71, Sep. 74, Oct. 84, Nov. 81, Dec. 74. - Average for 2021, 71.
The 2022 monthly forecasts are: Jan. 85-115, Feb. 90-120, Mar. 90-120, Apr. 95-125, May 95-125, Jun. 95-125, Jul. 100-130, Aug. 90-120, Sep. 85-115, Oct. 70 -100, Nov. 70-100, Dec. 75-105.
The 2022 monthly averages are: Jan. 87, Feb. 97, Mar. 117, Apr. 105, May 113, Jun. 123, Jul. 112, Aug. 100, Sep. 90, Oct. 93, Nov. 91, Dec. 81. - Average for 2022, 101.
The 2023 monthly forecasts are: Jan. 65-95, Feb. 65-95, Mar. 65-95, Apr. 70-100, May 70-100, Jun. 65-95, Jul. 65-95, Aug. 65-95, Sep. 80-110, Oct. 80-110, Nov. 80-110, Dec. 80-110.
The 2023 monthly averages are: Jan. 83, Feb. 83, Mar. 78, Apr. 85, May 75, Jun. 75, Jul. 80, Aug. 86, Sep. 94, Oct. 91, Nov. 83, Dec. 78. - Average for 2023, 82.
The 2024 monthly forecasts are: Jan. 65-95, Feb. 65-95, Mar. 65-95, Apr. 65-95, May 65-95, Jun. 65-95, Jul. 65-95, Aug. 65-95, Sep. 65-95, Oct. 65-95, Nov. 65-95, Dec. 65-95.
The 2024 monthly averages are: Jan. 80, Feb. 83, Mar. 85, Apr. 90, May 82, Jun. 82, Jul. 85, Aug. 80, Sep. 74, Oct. 76, Nov. 74, Dec. 74. - Average for 2024, 81.
The 2025 monthly forecasts are: Jan. 65-95, Feb. 65-95, Mar. 65-95, Apr. 60-90, May 60-90, Jun. 55-85, Jul. 60-90, Aug. 60-90, Sep. 60-90, Oct. 60-90, Nov. 60-90, Dec. 60-90.
The 2025 monthly averages are: Jan. 79, Feb. 75, Mar. 73, Apr. 68, May 64, Jun. 71, Jul. 71, Aug. 68, Sep. 68, Oct. 65, Nov. 64, Dec. 63. - Average for 2025, 69.
The 2026 monthly forecasts are: Jan. 55-85, Feb. 55-85, Mar. 95-125, Apr. 90-120, May 90-120, Jun. 75-105, Jul. 65-95, Aug. 80-110, Sep. 80-110, Oct. ??, Nov. ??, Dec. ??.
The 2026 monthly averages are: Jan. 67, Feb. 71, Mar. 103, Apr. 117, May 107, Jun. 85, Jul. 84, Aug. ??, Sep. ??, Oct. ??, Nov. ??, Dec. ??. - Average for 2026, ??.
Due to the war in Iran and the wider Middle East, this forecast is particularly uncertain and may be revised. Stay tuned!
The figures are crude approximations.
Some crude oil prices, daily and historical:
World demand and supply, also forecasts:
OPEC supply and prices:
Energy reserves - oil, gas and coal:
Brent crude futures, the global benchmark, jumped 6.24% to $78.79 per barrel 08.07.2026.
The Institute of Industrial Economics reports a dramatic oil market shift, where geopolitical conflict in Iran drove Brent crude from an average of 69 USD in 2025 to a peak of 117 USD in April 2026.
While prices have corrected to 78.79 USD 08.07.2026, this supply shock presents a dual challenge: soaring state revenues alongside high imported inflation,
creating a risk of stagflation as Norges Bank's interest rate hikes prove ineffective against supply-driven, rather than demand-driven, price increases.
For more details, visit the Institute of Industrial Economics website www.indeco.no.
PS. 14.07.2026.
Due to more hostilities in Iran and the wider Middle East, the price of crude oil has increased to 87.06 USD.
23.07.2026 Morning. Due to the expansion of the war in the Middle East, the crude oil price has risen to 98.21 USD.
However, we see no reason to revise our forecast of 65-95 USD for the average price for July.
But here are some conditions under which NØI-INDECO's forecasts for August and September of 80-110 USD are too low and may be adjusted upwards.
The Dual-Chokepoint Crisis
- Hormuz Blockade: The 90% traffic collapse has already cut off major Middle Eastern oil exports.
- Red Sea Blockade: Houthi attacks at Bab al-Mandeb block Saudi Arabia's alternative pipeline export route.
- Trapped Supply: This combined closure physically traps millions of barrels, removing the market's safety valve.
Risk of Infrastructure War
- Direct Strikes: Escalating military actions risk moving from tactical targets to oil fields and refineries.
- Prolonged Deficit: Physical destruction of energy assets would cause a severe, long-term global supply shortage.
NB! NORGES BANKS STYRINGSRENTE HAR NATURLIGVIS INGEN EFFEKT PÅ DENNE INFLASJONSIMPULSEN.
NB! NORGES BANK'S KEY RATE OF COURSE HAS NO EFFECT ON THIS INFLATION IMPULSE.
Translation tool Norwegian to English, French, German, Spanish, Arabic, Russian, Chinese etc., and vice versa: Google Translate.
En foreløpig analyse av hvordan vi kan motvirke stagflasjon som følge av råolje-prisstigningen fra Midtøsten-konflikten. Skattelette eller direkte kontantstøtte til lav- og middelsinntektsgrupper er det mest effektive verktøyet.
NØI-INDECOs mikro-makro Samgrepsmodell viser at dagens økonomiske krise krever en helt annen medisin enn tradisjonell pengepolitikk. Siden inflasjonen er globalt tilbudsdrevet, forsterker Norges Banks rentehevinger bare problemet ved at økte kapitalkostnader veltes delvis over i prisene av bedrifter med markedsmakt.
En momsreduksjon lekker i stor grad (20–50 %) inn i bedriftenes egne marginer. Den mest effektive strategien for å avverge stagflasjon er derfor en målrettet omfordelingspolitikk. Ved å gi skattelette eller direkte kontantstøtte til lav- og middelsinntektsgrupper, utnytter man en høy marginal konsumtilbøyelighet. Dette holder den kritiske fastlandsaktiviteten oppe, styrker kjøpekraften direkte, og gir en gunstig fordelingseffekt som reduserer Gini-indeksen.
For å utdype premissene i våre oppdaterte prognoser og den mikro-makroøkonomiske policyen, vil vi fremheve følgende kritiske punkter basert på instituttets Samgrepsmodell:
27.07.2026. AISC & AIIS: The 8 front in the Iran and the wider Middle East war: Iran vs Ukraine.
26.07.2026. After Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea, has Iran war now reached Caspian Sea? See: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/26/after-strait-of-hormuz-and-red-sea-has-iran-war-now-reached-caspian-sea. Source: Al Jazeera.
09.08.2026. Iran vows to keep Strait of Hormuz closed until US meets demands, see: https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20260809-iran-vows-to-keep-strait-of-hormuz-closed-until-us-meets-demands. Source: France 24
10.08.2026. Oil prices rise as traders assess US-Iran talks on Strait of Hormuz deal, see: https://www.euronews.com/business/2026/08/10/oil-prices-rise-as-traders-assess-us-iran-talks-on-strait-of-hormuz-deal. Source: Euronews.
GAIA - The Green Anarchist International Association
Folkerådet - Skyggekabinettet - Norges Anarkistråd - The Norwegian Anarchist Council – NACO:
04.08.2026. Kuttet i CO2-avgiften på bensin og diesel som går ut 1. september, må ikke fornyes av hensyn til kampen mot klimakrisen.
The cut in the CO2 tax on gasoline and diesel, which expires on September 1, must not be renewed in the interests of the fight against the climate crisis. Source: AIIS.
Translation tool Norwegian to English, French, German, Spanish, Arabic, Russian, Chinese etc., and vice versa: Google Translate.
Fra: World Economic Council – WEC
Til: Senterpartiet, Stortinget og Statsrådet + NRK, TV2 og NTB.
Sendt: onsdag 5. august 2026 19:53
Emne: Hei alle sammen. Dette med fortsatt avgifts-kutt på transport er en dårlig ide. Av klimahensyn må det være avgift på CO2 utslipp og subsidier på klimavennlig transport. En skattelette eller direkte støtte til distriktene er et bedre tiltak.
Hei alle sammen.
Dette med fortsatt avgifts-kutt på transport etter 1. september er en dårlig ide. Av klimahensyn må det være avgift på CO2 utslipp og subsidier på klimavennlig transport.
En skattelette eller direkte støtte, også gradert til distriktene - er et bedre tiltak.
Dette kan gå både til utsatt næringsliv og generelt til forbrukerne med lav og middels inntekt, for å bøte på eventuelle høye diesel og bensinpriser. De er middels nå. Kutt ut avgifts-kuttet 1. september.
Mvh Prof. Dr. Jens Hermundstad Østmoe. Medlem i Senterpartiet.
06.08.2026. Til Trygve S.V. og Sp! + Diverse kopier.
Dere må kutte ut alt tullet om at transport-subsidier er distrikts-politikk og et bidrag til desentralisering.
Det bidrar tvert imot som subsidier til sentralisering, for det er mest fossilbiler i sentrale strøk.
Avgifts-lettelse på transport som er CO2 forurensende er en uting, i kampen mot klimakrisen, som er overordnet alt annet.
Bli enige med resten av Tutti Frutti koalisjonen i morgen fredag 07.08.2026
om å kutte ut en forlengelse av det nåværende avgiftskuttet på fossil transport fra og med 1. september.
Med vennlig hilsen Prof. Dr. Jens Hermundstad Østmoe, mangeårig medlem i Senterpartiet. Og fortsatt medlem!
PS. 07.08.2026. Med Høyres hjelp er det nå flertall for å fjerne avgiftskuttet på bensin og diesel på stortinget 1. september. Det avtalte møtet 07.08.2026 i Tutti Frutti koalisjonen ble avlyst.
The general situation 27.07.2026
The NØI-INDECO-OSE is closely monitoring the situation in oil markets following recent developments in the conflict in the Middle East – with the escalation in hostilities affecting the Strait of Hormuz and energy infrastructure in the region increasing security of supply concerns and casting greater uncertainty over the market outlook. Threats to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, an increasingly important alternative shipping route for bypassing Hormuz, are adding to those concerns.
For the moment, crude oil and gas markets have continued to benefit from several cushioning factors. These include significant supplies from Gulf producers – notably through major efforts by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – that have continued to reach global markets via various routes. In addition, oil producers in other regions – notably the United States, Brazil, Venezuela and Kazakhstan – have increased exports, helping offset some of the supply losses. On the demand side, China has played an important role in stabilising markets by reducing its crude oil imports by nearly 50% compared with pre-war levels.
Ongoing emergency stock releases by IEA member countries continue to provide major relief to markets. Around 290 million barrels have been released by IEA member countries, with more continuing to flow to the market. IEA countries still hold a substantial volume of emergency stocks in reserve, including over 1 billion barrels of government-controlled stocks.
There is however no room for complacency on oil security amid the escalation in hostilities and drawing down of available commercial inventories. Refinery activity and product supplies have not picked up as much as crude deliveries, meaning that markets for refined oil products, including diesel and gasoline, are considerably tighter than those for crude. Ultimately, a full and unconditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz remains essential to avoid a further deterioration in global energy security.
For natural gas, a large majority of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply lost due to the Hormuz disruptions has been offset by LNG flows from other markets, led by the United States. But further delays in resuming Gulf exports risk keeping global LNG markets tighter for longe NØI-INDECO-OSE warns. Sources: IEA & AIIS.
CNN’s Middle East report, with updated news: https://edition.cnn.com/world/middle-east. Source: CNN.
Fox News’ updated news about the conflict with Iran, see: https://www.foxnews.com/category/world/conflicts/iran. Source: Fox News.
BBC's Middle East report, with updated news: https://www.bbc.com/news/world/middle_east. Source: BBC.
France24's Middle East report, with updated news: https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/ Source: France24. |